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This paper presents one-class Hellinger 
distance-based and one-class SVM modeling 
techniques that use a set of features to reveal user 
intent. The specific objective is to model user 
command profiles and detect deviations indicating 
a masquerade attack. The approach aims to model 
user intent, rather than only modeling sequences 
of user issued commands.  We hypothesize that 
each individual user will search in a targeted and 
limited fashion in order to find information 
germane to their current task. Masqueraders, on 
the other hand, will likely not know the file system 
and layout of another user's desktop, and would 
likely search more extensively and broadly. Hence, 
modeling a user search behavior to detect 
deviations may more accurately detect 
masqueraders. To that end, we extend prior 
research that uses UNIX command sequences 
issued by users as the audit source by relying upon 
an abstraction of commands. We devised a 
taxonomy of UNIX commands that is used to 
abstract command sequences.  The experimental 
results show that the approach does not lose 
information and performs comparably to or 
slightly better than the modeling approach based 
on simple UNIX command frequencies. 
 
1. Introduction 
The masquerade attack is a class of attacks, 
in which a user of a system illegitimately poses as, 
or assumes the identity of another legitimate user. 
Identity theft in financial transaction systems is 
perhaps the best known example.  Masquerade 
attacks are extremely serious, especially in the case 
of an insider who can cause considerable damage to 
an organization. The insider attack detection 
problem remains one of the more important research 
areas requiring new insights to mitigate against this 
threat.   
A common approach to counter this type of 
attack, which has been the subject of prior research, 
is to develop novel algorithms that can effectively 
identify suspicious behaviors that may lead to the 
identification of imposters.  We do not focus on 
whether an access by some user is authorized since 
we assume that the masquerader does not attempt to 
escalate the privileges of the stolen identity, rather 
the masquerader simply accesses whatever the 
victim can access. However, we conjecture that the 
masquerader is unlikely to know how the victim 
behaves when using a system. It is this key 
assumption that we rely upon in order to detect a 
masquerader. Thus, our focus in this paper is on 
monitoring a user’s behavior in real time to 
determine whether current commands issued by a 
user are consistent with the user’s historical 
behavior. The far more challenging problems of 
thwarting mimicry attack and other obfuscation 
techniques, as well as the use of honeypots or 
honeytokens, are beyond the scope of this paper.   
         Masquerade attacks can occur in several 
different ways. In general terms, a masquerader may 
get access to a legitimate user’s account either by 
stealing a victim’s password, or through a break in 
and installation of a rootkit or keylogger. In either 
case, the user’s identity is illegitimately acquired. 
Another perhaps more common case is laziness and 
misplaced trust by a user, such as the case when a 
user leaves his or her terminal or client open and 
logged in allowing any nearby co-worker to pose as 
a masquerader. In the first two cases, the identity 
thief must log in with the victim’s credentials and 
begin issuing commands within the bounds of one 
user session. We conjecture that legitimate users 
initiate the same repeated commands each time they 
log in to set their environment before using it, 
initiate some set of applications (read email, open a 
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browser, or start a chat session) and similarly, clean 
up and shut down applications when they log off. 
Such repeated behaviors constitute a profile that can 
be modeled and used to check the authenticity of a 
user session early before significant damage is done. 
The case of hijacking a user’s session is perhaps a 
bit more complicated. We presume the preamble 
commands issued by the legitimate user have 
already concluded and have no value in detecting the 
masquerader. In either case, a monitoring system 
ought to detect any significant deviations from a 
user’s typical profiled behaviors in order to detect a 
likely masquerade attack. Ideally, we seek to detect a 
possible masquerader at any time during a session.             
        In an operational monitoring system, one 
naturally would be concerned with the error rate of a 
detector. In a nutshell, we posit that at a minimum a 
challenge/response mitigation strategy may work 
well to prevent significant damage to a system by a 
masquerader. The downside of a false positive is 
essentially annoyance by a legitimate user who may 
be challenged too frequently. However, a false 
positive should do no damage. An interesting 
problem to study is how to calibrate a detector to 
balance its false positive rate to ensure its false 
negative rate is minimized. False negatives in this 
context, i.e., an undetected masquerader, are far 
more dangerous than an annoying false positive. A 
thorough discussion of mitigation strategies is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
      In this paper we extend prior work on modeling 
user command sequences for masquerade detection. 
We use one-class support vector machines and 
introduce the use of the Hellinger Distance metric to 
compute a similarity measure between the most 
recently issued commands that a user types with a 
model of the user’s command profile. Previous work 
has focused on auditing and modeling sequences of 
user commands including work on enriching 
command sequences with information about 
arguments of commands.  [1], [3], and [4]. 
     We propose an approach to profile a user’s 
behavior based on a ‘taxonomy’ of UNIX 
commands. The taxonomy abstracts the audit data 
and enriches the meaning of a user’s profile. Hence,  
commands that perform similar types of actions are 
grouped together in one category making profiled 
sequences more abstract and meaningful. 
Furthermore, modeling sequences of commands is 
complicated whenever “Never-Before-Seen-
Commands” are observed. A command taxonomy 
reduces this complexity, since any distinct command 
is replaced by its category, which is very likely to 
have been observed in the past. Commands are thus 
assigned a type, and the sequence of command types 
is modeled rather than individual commands.  
       One particular type of command is “information 
gathering” commands, i.e. search commands. We 
conjecture that a masquerader is unlikely to have the 
depth of knowledge of the victim’s machine (files, 
locations of important directories, available 
applications, etc.), and hence, a masquerader would 
likely first perform information gathering and search 
commands before initiating specific actions. A 
taxonomic command abstraction helps achieve our 
goal to model the user’s intent in this specific case. 
A detector may increase its suspicion of an attack in 
real time if it detects monitored search command 
actions that deviate substantially from the user’s 
profile on search commands.  
       In Section 2 of this paper, we briefly present the 
results of prior research work on masquerade 
detection. Section 3 expands on the objective and the 
approach taken in this work. The experiments 
conducted to evaluate whether a command 
taxonomy impacts the efficacy of user behavior 
models are presented in Section 4. In section 5, we 
evaluate the results of our experiments while section 
6 discusses future work needed to improve and 
better evaluate our proposed modeling approach. 
Section 7 concludes the paper summarizing the 
contributions of this paper.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
In the general case of computer user profiling, 
the entire audit source can include information from 
a variety of sources:  
• Command line calls issued by users 
• System call monitoring for unusual 
application use/events 
• Database/file access monitoring 
• Organization policy management rules and 
compliance logs 
 
The type of analysis used is primarily the 
modeling of statistical features, such as the 
frequency of events, the duration of events, the co-
occurrence of multiple events combined through 
logical operators, and the sequence or transition of 
events. However, most of this work failed to reveal 
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or clarify the user’s intent when issuing commands. 
The focus is primarily on accurately detecting 
change or unusual command sequences. In this 
section, we focus on the approaches reported in the 
literature that profile users by the commands they 
issue. 
Schonlau et al. in [1] applied six masquerade 
detection methods to a data set of “truncated” UNIX 
commands for 70 users collected over a several 
month period. Each user had 15,000 commands 
collected over a period of time ranging between a 
few days and several months. 50 users were 
randomly chosen to serve as intrusion targets. The 
other 20 users were used as masqueraders. The first 
5000 commands for each of the 50 users were left 
intact or “clean”, the next 10,000 commands were 
randomly injected with 100-command blocks issued 
by the 20 masquerade users. The commands have 
been inserted at the beginning of a block, so that if a 
block is contaminated, all of its 100 commands are 
inserted from another user’s list of executed 
commands. The complete data set and more 
information about it can be found at 
http://www.schonlau.net. The objective was to 
accurately detect the “dirty” blocks and classify 
them as masquerader blocks.  
The first detection method applied by 
Schonlau et al. for this task, called “uniqueness” 
relies on the fact that half of the commands in the 
training data are unique and many more are 
unpopular amongst the users. The second method 
investigated was the Bayes one-step Markov 
approach. It is based on one step transitions from 
one command to the next. The approach, due to 
DuMouchel (1999), uses a Bayes factor statistic to 
test the null hypothesis that the observed one-step 
command transition probabilities are consistent with 
the historical transition matrix. The two hypotheses 
modeled are the null hypothesis, which assumes that 
the observed transitions probabilities stem from the 
historical transition matrix, and the alternative 
hypothesis which assumes that they were generated 
from a Dirichlet distribution. 
A hybrid multi-step Markov method has also 
been used. In order to overcome the high-
dimensionality, inherent in multi-step Markov chain, 
a “mixture transition distribution” (MTD) approach 
has been used to model the transition probabilities. 
When the test data contain many commands 
unobserved in the training data, a Markov model is 
not usable. Here, a simple independence model w/ 
probabilities estimated from a contingency table of 
users versus commands may be more appropriate. 
The method used automatically toggles between a 
Markov model and an independence model 
generated from a multinomial random distribution as 
needed, depending on whether the test data are 
“usual”, i.e. the commands have been previously 
seen, or “unusual”, i.e. Never-Before-Seen 
Commands (NBSCs). We note with interest that the 
proposed taxonomy of commands tends to reduce if 
not eliminate the problem of modeling “Never-
Before-Seen-Commands” since any command is 
likely to be placed in a category with other similar 
commands. Hence, although a specific command 
may never have been observed, members of its class 
probably were.  
The compression method, which was also 
applied to the Schonlau data set, was based on the 
premise that test data appended to historical training 
data compress more readily when the test data stems 
indeed from the same user rather than from a 
masquerader, and was implemented through the 
UNIX tool “compress” which implements a 
modified Lempel-Ziv algorithm. 
IPAM (Incremental Probabilistic Action 
Modeling), another method applied on the same 
dataset, and used by Davidson & Hirsch in [5] and 
[16] to build an adaptive command line interface, is 
also based on one-step command transition 
probabilities estimated from the training data. 
Probabilities are continuously updated using an 
exponential updating scheme. With arrival of a new 
command, probabilities are aged by multiplying with 
alpha and (1-alpha) is added to the most recent 
transition.  
The sequence-match approach was presented 
by Lane & Brodley [6]. For each new command, a 
similarity measure between the most 10 recent 
commands and a user’s profile is computed. A user’s 
profile consists of command sequences of length 10 
that the user has previously used. The similarity 
measure is a count of the number of matches in a 
command-by-command comparison of 2 command 
sequences with a greater weight assigned to adjacent 
matches. This similarity measure is computed for the 
test data sequence paired with each command 
sequence in the profile.  
Maxion and Townsend applied a naïve Bayes 
classifier, which has been widely used in text 
classification tasks, to the same data set in [3]. 
Maxion provides a thorough and detailed 
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investigation of classification errors [7], 
highlighting why some masquerade victims are 
more vulnerable than others, and why some 
masqueraders are more successful than others. 
Maxion and Townsend also designed a new 
experiment, which they called the “1v49” 
experiment, in order to conduct this error analysis.  
A method, that is significantly different from other 
intrusion detection technologies, was presented by 
Coull et al. [11]. The method is known as semi-
global alignment and is a modification of the Smith-
Waterman local alignment algorithm, with a scoring 
system that rewards the alignment of commands in 
the user segment but does not necessarily penalize 
the misalignment of large portions of the signature 
of the user. 
   Another approach called a self-consistent naïve 
Bayes classifier was proposed by Yung [13] and 
applied on the same data set. This method is a 
combination of the naïve Bayes classifier and the 
EM-algorithm. The self-consistent naïve Bayes 
classifier does not have to make a binary decision 
for each new block of commands. Rather, it assigns 
a score to it that indicates the probability that the 
block is a masquerader block. Moreover, this 
classifier can change scores of earlier sessions as 
well as later sessions 
   Oka et al. had the intuition that the dynamic 
behavior of a user appearing in a sequence can be 
captured by correlating not only connected events, 
but also events that are not adjacent to each other 
while appearing within a certain distance (non-
connected events). Based on that intuition they have 
developed the layered networks approach based on 
the Eigen Co-occurrence Matrix (ECM) in [13] and 
[14]. The ECM method extracts the causal 
relationship embedded in sequences of commands, 
where a co-occurrence means the relationship 
between every two commands within an interval of 
sequences of data. This type of relationship cannot 
be reflected through histograms nor through n-
grams.  
Forrest et al. proposed a real-time on-line anomaly 
detection system [15] that mimicked the mechanisms 
used by the natural immune systems. This was done 
by monitoring system calls of running privileged 
processes (profiles were built using normal runs of 
such programs), rather than sequences of user 
commands, and therefore used a different data set 
than the Schonlau data set. The modeling was 
limited to privileged root processes since they have 
more access to computer resources than user 
processes, and they have a limited range of behavior 
that is quite stable and predictable. A separate 
database of normal behavior is built for each 
privileged process. The database was specific to a 
particular architecture, software version and 
configuration, local administrative policies, and 
usage patterns, providing a unique definition of 
“self”.  
Table 1 presents the results of all methods 
described above, that were applied to the Schonlau 
data set and which are based on a two-class training 
approach of a self model and a non-self model. In a 
real-word setting, it is probably more appropriate to 
use a one-class training approach; as users join and 
leave the organizations, keeping the non-self model 
up-to-date can be really challenging.  Wang and 
Stolfo tried such an approach in [4] by using both, a 
naïve Bayes classifier and a Support Vector Machine 
(SVM), to detect masqueraders. With the naïve 
Bayes classifier, they have used the multinomial 
model, as well as the multivariate Bernoulli event 
model. Their work has shown that the difference in 
detection accuracy between the two models is not so 
obvious in one-class training, especially when the 
false positive rate is low, unlike the case of multi-
class training, where the multinomial model 
performs better than the Bernoulli one. 
 
 Method False Alarms (%) Missing Alarms (%) 
Uniqueness 1.4 60.6 
Bayes one-step Markov 6.7 30.7 
Hybrid multi-step Markov 3.2 50.7 
Compression 5.0 65.8 
Sequence Match 3.7 63.2 
IPAM 2.7 58.9 
Naïve Bayes (Updating) 1.3 38.5 
Naïve Bayes (No Upd.) 4.6 33.8 




Naïve Bayes + EM 1.3 25.0 
 
Table 1: Summary of accuracy performance of Two-Class 
Based Anomaly Detectors Using the Schonlau Data Set 
 
 
Wang and Stolfo have also investigated SVMs using 
the binary features and frequency-based features. 
The one-class SVM algorithm using binary features 
was the best one among all four one-class training 
algorithms that were analyzed. It also performed 
better than most of the two-class algorithms listed 
above, except the two-class multinomial naïve Bayes 
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algorithm with updating. In summary, Wang and 
Stolfo’s experiment confirmed that for masquerade 
detection, one-class training is as effective as two 
class training. The practical significance of this is 
important. In prior work, a masquerade detector is 
trained as a classifier by mixing labeled data from a 
number of different users. Besides the privacy 
implications of this approach, whenever a new user 
enters or leaves an organization each detector would 
necessarily be retrained in order to maintain its 
accuracy. In the case of “one-class” modeling, an 
anomaly detector is trained for each user on their 
own data. It is this approach that sets the stage for 
our subsequent work described next.   
 
3. Objective and Approach 
 
When dealing with the masquerader attack 
detection problem, it is important to remember that 
the attacker has already obtained credentials to 
access a system. When presenting the stolen 
credentials, the attacker is then a legitimate user to 
any access control system. Ideally, monitoring a 
user’s actions after being granted access is required 
in order to detect such attacks. Furthermore, if we 
can determine the user’s intent, we may 
automatically determine if actions of a user are 
malicious or not. We have postulated that certain 
classes of user commands reveal user intent. For 
instance, “search” should be an interesting behavior 
to monitor. Hence, we defined a taxonomy of 
commands to readily identity and model search 
behavior. Another behavior that is interesting to 
monitor is remote access to other systems and the 
communication or egress of large amounts of data to 
remote systems, which may be an indication of 
illegal copying or distribution of sensitive 
information. Once again, the taxonomy defined 
allows a system to automatically audit and model 
this behavior as well. However, user behavior 
naturally varies from each user. We believe there is 
no one model or one easily specified policy can 
capture the inherent vagaries of human behavior. 
Instead, we aim to automatically learn a distinct 
user’s behavior, much like a credit card customer’s 
distinct buying patterns.  
Our objective is to model the normal pattern 
of submitted commands of a certain user in a UNIX 
environment assuming that the masquerader will 
exhibit different behavior from the legitimate user 
and this deviation will be easily noticed. In order to 
detect the deviations we compute the Hellinger 
distance between the frequencies of recent 
commands or command categories that show up in 
one block of commands of window size w and a 
second block of the same window size shifted by 
only one command. Hence, this approach essentially 
tracks a user’s behavior and measures any changes 
in that behavior. Any significant change will raise an 
alarm. In the following we present the command 
taxonomy that we have developed as well as the 
Hellinger distance applied to blocks of issued 
commands.  
 
3.1. UNIX Command Taxonomy 
 We abstract the set of Linux/Unix 
commands into a taxonomy of command categories 
as presented in Figure 1. In particular, we are 
interested in identifying the specific set of 
commands that reveal the user’s intent to search, to 
change access control privileges, and to copy or 
print information. Once these commands are 
identified, we can extract features representing such 




Figure1: Taxonomy of Linux and Unix Commands 
 
 The taxonomy has 14 different categories: 
Access Control, Applications, Communications / 
Networking, Display / Formatting, Execution / 
Program Control, File System, I/O Peripherals, 
Information Gathering, Other, Process Management, 
System Management, Unknown, and Utilities. Most 
categories were further classified into sub-
categories, however some did not require more 
granularity, such as the “Resource Management” 
category. The “Information Gathering” category 
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includes commands such as “find” and “fgrep”. 
Examples of commands in the “Process 
Management” category include “kill”, “nohup”, and 
“renice”. “date”, “clock” and “cal” are examples of 
commands that fall in the “Utilities” category.  The 
“Other” category includes commands that have been 
recognized but could not be classified under any 
other category. However, the “Unknown” category 
includes commands that were not identified or script 




3.2. Hellinger Distance 
The Hellinger distance computes the change 
in two frequency tables, each table is a histogram 
representing the frequency of some variable at some 
particular moment in time. Here, we measure the 
frequency of commands, and thus one can develop a 
detector of abnormal behavior by modeling user 
command frequencies and the changes in that 










where fp[] is the array of normalized frequencies for 
the first set, ft[] the one for the second set, and n the 
number of possible commands/ command categories. 
This distance metric is applied whenever a user 
issues a command. A previous frequency table that 
modeled the previous commands is compared to a 
newly updated frequency table by modifying the 
frequency of the command types. Hence, each 
command creates a new Hellinger distance score that 
is subjected to threshold logic. Each bin of the 
frequency table is any chosen category of command 
we wish to model. In the most general case all 
command categories would be tracked. The method 
is straightforward and efficient to implement. It 
remains to me seen how accurate it may be, and 
whether modeling categories of command 
significantly reduces the information available when 
modeling sequences of commands. In other words, is 
it more accurate to model sequences of commands or 
frequencies of commands’ categories. It is that 
question we address next.  
 
3.3. One-Class Support Vector Machines 
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are linear 
classifiers used for classification and regression. 
They are known as maximal margin classifiers, as 
opposed to probabilistic classifiers, thanks to their 
ability of minimizing empirical classification error 
while maximizing geometric margin. 
SVMs are typically used in multi-class 
classification tasks. Scholkopf et. al. proposed a way 
to adapt SVMs to the one-class classification task 
[16]. The one-class SVM algorithm uses examples 
from one class only for training. Just like in multi-
class classification tasks, it maps input data into a 
high-dimensional feature space suing a kernel 
function, such as the linear, polynomial, or Radial 
Basis Function (RBF) kernels. The origin is treated 
as the only example from other classes. The 
algorithm then finds the hyperplane that provides the 
maximum margin separating the training data from 
the origin in an iterative manner.  
The kernel function is defined as: 
k(x,y)=(Φ(x).Φ(y)),where x,y∈X, X is the training 
data set, and Φ is the feature mapping to a high-
dimensional space X  F. The RBF Kernel is 













As mentioned in previous sections, the task here is 
to monitor changes in user command behavior, and 
detect any deviations from normal behavior. We use 
the Schonlau data set presented in section 2, 
comprised of sequences of 15,000 commands for 50 
users. The first 5,000 have all been issued by the 
legitimate user, however the remaining 10,000 have 
been injected at random locations with blocks of 100 
commands issued by other users (or simulated 
masqueraders). For each user, there are between 0 
and 24 masquerade blocks. In the first experiment, 
we apply the Hellinger distance to detect changes in 
user behavior. In the second experiment, we use the 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) for detection on the 
Schonlau data set, and we call it the SEA 
experiment, as in [3]. Finally in the third experiment, 
we also use SVMs, but with a different experimental 
setup where we train the model using one user’s data 
and test on all other 49 users’ data, which is why the 
experiment is called the 1v49 experiment. 
 
4.1. Hellinger Distance Experiment 
In order to detect the changes in user behavior, 
we compute the Hellinger distance between two 
blocks of commands of size w. With each new 
command, we count the frequencies of the 
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commands or command categories within the block 
of the last w commands.  We shift the window of w 
commands by one command, and we count the same 
frequencies for the new block. Then we compute the 
Hellinger distance between the two sets of 
commands. However, we need to determine what the 
most appropriate window size of w should be. We 
describe below how we determined the value of w. 
 
4.1.1. Determining the window size w 
We conducted a first experiment where the 
profiles of all users have been modeled using several 
window sizes. For each user, we divide the first 
5000 commands into blocks of size w, and we count 
the frequencies of command categories within each 
block. Then we calculate the mean and the standard 
deviation for each of those frequencies. The results 
for users 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 2 for window 
sizes of 50, 100, and 200 commands, respectively. 
By looking at both profiles, we notice that the two 
users have indeed different profiles. This shows the 
potential for detection of the command blocks that 
have been contaminated by another user’s 
commands. The window size has been selected, such 
that the standard deviation is not too low, which 
allows for differentiation between the user profiles, 
and simultaneously not too high, so that an excessive 
number of false positives is avoided. This tradeoff 
serves as the core “calibration” process for a detector 
using this method. The window size w that helped 
achieve a tradeoff between these two objectives was 
a size of 50 commands. 
 
4.1.2. Determining a threshold 
Once the window size was determined, we needed 
to determine the threshold used to classify a block as 
a masquerader block or a normal user block. For 
that, we have computed the Hellinger distance 
between consecutive blocks with a window 50 
commands, shifting the window by 1 command 
only. We have done this for the first 5000 
commands, and determined the maximum Hellinger 
distance value for each user. In order to limit the 
false positive rate, we scaled the threshold value to 
95% of the maximum value for each user. So each 
user has a distinct threshold. Note that no inter-user 
data is mixed for this process. This constitutes the 
‘one-class’ modeling approach over user command 
categories, and the method is relatively easy and 
efficient to implement. (A fixed size histogram 
would be maintained for each user at run-time in an 
operational setting.) 
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Figure 2: Profile of users 1and 2 using a Mahalanobis distance, 
the commands taxonomy, and window sizes of 200, 100, and 50 
commands. 
 
4.2. SVM Experiments 
We have used the LIBSVM package [19] to 
conduct our SVM experiments. LIBSVM is a tool 
for support vector classification, regression, and 
distribution estimation. It supports both multi-class 
classification and one-class classification. The one-
class SVM function provided by this tool uses the 
RBF kernel. We have applied this kernel with the 
default settings to conduct the SEA and 1v49 
experiments. We have created a new version of the 
LIBSVM code, so that the one-class prediction 
models output the probability that a vector belongs 
to the “self” class, rather than output the 
classification value “self’ or “non-self”. 
We have used two different ways to represent 
features. The first is frequency-based where we 
count the number of times a simple command or a 
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command category, retrieved using the command 
taxonomy, shows up in the data set. The second 
approach is binary where we indicate whether the 
command or command category is present in the 
data set. 
 
4.2.1.  SEA Experiment 
In this experiment we follow the methodology 
described in [1] and [4], and we show that the 
performance of one-class SVMs (ocSVM) using 
command categories per our taxonomy is almost the 
same as the performance of ocSVM that uses simple 
commands. We use the first 5000 commands of a 
user as positives examples for training the model. 
No negative examples are used for training. Then we 
test the classifier using the remaining 10,000 
commands of the user, which may have injected 
command blocks from other users under a 
probability distribution described in [2], which we 
will refer to as the “dirty” blocks. 
 
4.2.2.  1v49 Experiment 
 The 1v49 was introduced by Maxion and 
Townsend to avoid some of the inherent 
methodological problems with the Schonlau data set. 
One major shortcoming of the experimental setup 
that Schonlau used is that each user in the data set 
has a different number of “dirty” blocks than the 
remaining 49 users. Moreover, these blocks originate 
from different users. This may prevent the 
comparison of the performances of the classification 
algorithms on solid ground. In order to better 
evaluate and compare the performance of these one-
class classification algorithms, a different data 
configuration is used: the first 5,000 commands of a 
user are used as negative training data, no positive 
examples are used. The test data is made up of the 
remaining 49 users’ first 5,000 commands, which 
make the positive test examples, s well as the non-
masquerade data from the additional 10,000 




5.1. Hellinger-Distance Method Evaluation 
 
After computing one classifier for each user, the 
detection task includes computing the Hellinger 
distance in the same manner as above, but for the 
remaining 10,000 commands. It is important to note 
that our approach is a one-class modeling approach. 
No positive examples of masquerade blocks were 
used for training, and no non-self models were 
computed for each user. The test of self-recognition 
is the same as in the Schonlau et al. paradigm, with 
between 76 and 100 blocks of self data presented to 
the detector for each user. Since the masquerader 
commands have been injected into blocks of 100 
commands, we calculate one value out of all 
computed Hellinger distances for one block and we 
compare it with the classification threshold. Because 
the Hellinger distance scores are very noisy, we take 
the average score over the 100-command block as 
the overall score. We have also experimented with 
using the maximum value of those scores. However, 
better classification accuracy has been achieved by 
using the average scores. If the average score is 
above the user threshold, the block is classified as a 
masquerader block. We do not use any blocks that 
have been classified as normal to update the user 
profile or recalculate the threshold.  
A typical means to visualize the performance 
of any classification algorithm is the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which plots 
the sensitivity rate against 1- specificity rate. In order 
to build the ROC curve, we need to count the 
number of true positives (TP), true negative (TN), 
false positives (FP), and false negatives (FN) for a 
set of cutoffs according to a classification rule. A 
true positive is a masquerader command block that 
has been correctly identified by our algorithm. A 
false positive is a normal user’s command block that 
was misclassified as a masquerader block. Similarly 
a true negative is a normal user’s block that our 
algorithm classifies as normal, and a false negative 
is a masquerader block that our algorithm fails to 
detect, the latter being perhaps the worst case of 














where nTN, nFP, nTP, nFN are the 
numbers of true negatives, false positives, true 
positives, and false negatives respectively. Figure 3 
displays the ROC curves for users 2 and 6 for the 
Hellinger distance-based approach using the 
frequencies of simple commands and the same 
approach using the frequencies of command 
categories.  
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The Area Under Curve (AUC), also known as 
the ROC score, which is a measure of the area under 
the ROC curve, reflects the performance of the 
detection method used. The higher the AUC is, the 
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Figure 3: ROC curves for users 18 and 36 respectively using the 
Hellinger distance metric. mean_cat represents the model where 
the Hellinger distance is computed using frequencies of 
command categories. mean_cmd stands for the model where the 
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Figure 4: User-by-user comparison of ROC scores (AUCs) 
 
The AUCs displayed in Figure 3 of the 
taxonomy-based model for user 18 and 36 are 0.865 
and 0.913 and those of the command-based model 
are 0.862 and 0.905 respectively. For some users the 
taxonomy-based model performed better than the 
command-based one, for others it did not. Figure 4 
shows a user-by-user AUC comparison or all users 
whose files have been contaminated. Some users had 
no masquerader blocks injected, and therefore it was 
not possible to build a ROC curve for them. 
Comparing the average AUC for those scores, the 
taxonomy-based modeling method achieves more 
than a 1.8% improvement over the command-based 
one, with less information. 
Figure 5 shows a comparison of the total 
number of users whose files have been contaminated 
and whose AUC’s are higher than a certain AUC x 
versus the value of x. The taxonomy-based approach 
outperforms the simple-commands-based 
approaches in most cases, and it only underperforms 
the other approach for very small AUC values. 
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Figure 5: Number of users with ROC scores higher than x 
versus x 
 
5.2. One-class SVM Evaluation 
 
5.2.1. SEA Experiment Evaluation 
Table 2 shows the results achieved by the one-
class SVM classifiers. The ocSVMs that use the 
command taxonomy achieve better false alarm in 
both cases, when using the frequency-based model 
and when using the binary model. With the 
frequency-based model, the ocSVM using the 
command taxonomy also achieves comparable 
results with the ocSVM using simple commands. 
This is not true for the ocSVM using the binary 
feature. This can be explained by the difficulty to 
build representative models for the users based on a 
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binary vector that only has 14 components, since the 
taxonomy is only made up of 14 different categories, 
particularly when the training data set includes 5,000 
commands. With such a number of commands, the 
chances that all 14 categories of commands are 
represented are relatively high, and therefore the 
binary models built for the users will be very 
similar, i.e. the classifier will be unable to correctly 
decide whether a test command block is a self block 
or a masquerader block. 
 
Method Hit Rate False Positive Rate 
ocSVM using simple 
cmds  (freq.-based model) 
98.7% 66.47% 
ocSVM using taxonomy 
(freq.-based model) 
94.8% 60.68% 
ocSVM using simple 
commands (binary model) 
99.13% 66.8% 
ocSVM using taxonomy 
(binary model) 
86.58% 56.9% 
Table 2: SEA experiment results 
 
As mentioned earlier, we have modified the 
LIBSVM code so that the one-class prediction 
models output a probability that a vector belongs to 
the “self” class, rather than output the classification 
value “self’ or “non-self”. We have used these 
prediction values to build ROC curves for each 
model/user, and we show the corresponding AUC 
scores in figure 6. We have averaged out the 
performance of all user models to build a single 
ROC curve for each method in figures 7-10. The 
ROC curves and corresponding AUC values confirm 
that, when using the frequency-based model to build 
the feature vectors, using the command taxonomy 
achieves comparable results to those achieved when 
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Figure 6: Comparison of AUC scores achieved using the 4 




Figure 7: ROC curve for ocSVM with binary model using 




Figure 8: ROC curve for ocSVM with binary model using 





Figure 9: ROC curve for ocSVM with frequency-based model 
using simple commands (AUC=0.905) 
 
  
Figure 10: ROC curve for ocSVM with frequency-based model 
using command taxonomy (AUC=0.89) 
 
5.2.2. 1v49 Experiment Evaluation 
 
The results of the 1v49 experiment shown in 
table 3 and in figure 11 confirmed the results of the 
SEA experiment. In particular, it proved that high 
hot rates can be achieved with the taxonomy, and 
that when using the frequency-based modeling 
approach, building features while using of the 
taxonomy allows for comparable results to those 





Method Hit Rate False Positive Rate 
ocSVM using simple 
cmds  (freq.-based model) 
96.56% 66.47% 
ocSVM using taxonomy 
(freq.-based model) 
87.54% 60.66% 
ocSVM using simple 
commands (binary model) 
97.81% 67.03% 
ocSVM using taxonomy 
(binary model) 
81.91% 57.11% 
Table 3: 1v49 experiment results 
 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425
User
Bernoulli w/o Taxonomy Bernoulli with Taxonomy
Freq.-based w/o Taxonomy Freq.-based with Taxonomy
 














Bernoulli w/o Taxonomy Bernoulli with Taxonomy
Freq.-based w/o Taxonomy Freq.-based with Taxonomy
 
 
Figure 11: Comparison of AUC scores achieved using the 4 
models in the 1v49 experiment 
 
6. Discussion and future work 
Unlike a modeling approach based on 
frequencies of simple commands, the taxonomy-
based approach should not raise an alarm for a 
masquerader if, for instance, the same legitimate 
user starts running a different C compiler than what 
he/she normally uses. Both compilers used should be 
under the “Applications” category. So if the user 
continues doing the same things he has been doing 
before, except for the change of compilers, the user 
model does not change if we use our taxonomy-
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based approach. However, using the simple 
commands approach might raise an alarm for a 
masquerade. Therefore, our approach is expected to 
limit the occurrences of false positives. Moreover, 
the taxonomy-based approach tends to reduce the 
problem of modeling “Never-Before-Seen-
Commands” since any command is likely to be 
placed in a category with other similar commands, 
i.e., although a specific command may never have 
been observed, members of its class probably were.  
The results shown above confirm that the 
information that is lost by compressing the different 
user shell commands into a few categories does not 
affect the masquerader detection ability 
significantly. We expect our modeling approach to 
achieve even better results when using real 
masquerader data. This is a crucial observation. The 
Schonlau datasets are not “true Masquerader” data 
sets. The data from different users were randomly 
mixed standing as a simulation of a masquerader 
attack. A willful act of malfeasance after identity 
theft is yet to be tested, albeit there is no generally 
available data set of this nature for scientific study. 
Hence, Schonlau resorted to simulating this 
malfeasance in as simple a fashion as possible, 
monitoring different users and mixing their data. The 
specific test to determine whether modeling search 
command behavior is, thus, not possible with this 
dataset.  Figure 12 clearly shows that the distribution 
of the categories of commands for normal users and 
for masqueraders are very similar. Moreover, 
“information gathering” or “search” commands only 
make up between and 10 and 12% of all the 
commands for both sets. This suggests that the 
Schonlau data set is not good enough for evaluating 
our hypothesis that masqueraders exhibit unusual 
amounts of search behavior that deviates 
substantially from their victim’s behavior. . 
In our future work, we plan to tackle specific 
areas of work: a) developing a “capture the flag” 
exercise in our lab with user volunteers serving as 
masqueraders to create suitable datasets for 
experimentation and evaluations, and b) using other 
approaches for classification other than one-class 
support vector machines and averaging of Hellinger 
distance scores within one block of commands. 
These may include the rate of change of the 
Hellinger distance or the quantiles of the empirical 
distribution of the scores, as well as other one-class 
anomaly detection methods. Moreover, we will 
conduct an analysis of why the taxonomy achieved 
better results for certain users and not for others, and 
will enhance our Hellinger distance-based approach 
with an incremental update feature in order to adapt 
to concept drift. Intuitively, this is achieved by 
adjusting the frequency table by decrementing the 
frequency entry of the oldest command type, and 
incrementing the category of the most recently 
issued command and incrementally updating the 

































































































































Figure 12: Distribution of command categories for normal 
user and for masquerader commands 
 
7. Conclusion  
Masquerade attacks are a serious computer 
security problem. In this paper, we have presented a 
taxonomy of Unix and Linux commands developed 
to improve upon previous user modeling approaches 
based upon sequences of commands. The proposed 
approach aims to capture the intent of a user more 
accurately. We have used the taxonomy for one-
class modeling of user behavior in order to detect 
masquerades in UNIX environments using a 
standard benchmark dataset. Even though the data 
set used is not the most suitable data for the 
masquerade detection problem, the command 
taxonomy-based modeling achieved results 
comparable or slightly better than modeling the 
behavior with simple commands for this dataset. 
This establishes some evidence that our conjecture 
that a taxonomy should help in detecting 
masqueraders while decreasing the number of false 
positives is correct. Future larger scale studies in our 
lab using volunteer masqueraders will be reported 
upon in future work. We expect to see better results 
using real data where the masquerader is expected to 
perform extensive search while exploring the new 
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